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In The Legal Imagination Professor James White probes the
language of law. With that gentle skill born only of great charity,
he also leads the readers to face the possibilities for life and death
that law offers.
Because the book has already been cogently reviewed,' I shall
not attempt another review here. Rather I shall undertake a reflec-
tive response to it, with special reference to the nature of legal
education and the linkage, as I see it, of law, language, death, and
life.
I. THE PROBLEM OF CHARACTERIZATION
The introduction to this book describes it as the text for a kind
of "advanced course in reading and writing,"' 2 a characterization
which becomes revealing when Professor White explains that, in his
view, "'reading and writing' [can] be said to cover the whole of
one's education." '3 Although I am not sure that the book is generally
suitable as the text for a law school course, the author also hopes
"that one can be interested simply in reading it through."4 One can
indeed. As a book which stands independently it is a singular contri-
bution-the script for perfected legal education.
The book contains six chapters, bearing such unassuming titles
as "The Lawyer as Writer"5 and "Judgment and Explanation: The
Legal Mind at Work."' Each chapter is divided into groups of se-
lected readings, commentary (at times extensive), and questions,
which lead to writing assignments (twenty-one in all, plus alterna-
tives). The readings, which precede and color the assignments and
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constitute the bulk of the volume, come from the author's notable
familiarity with literature and the classics as well as law. They
include, in addition to case opinions and statutes, poems, excerpts
from novels, plays, and histories, and even a bit of Episcopal lit-
urgy.7
The book's range of selections is certainly unusual for a case-
book. 8 Its organizing principle is more than unusual; it is a wholly
fresh departure: Professor White involves the reader in a compan-
ionable, systematic venture of the mind, the ultimate goal of which
is to foster responsible, imaginative lives in the practice of law.
Toward this end, White defines and animates the so-called legal
imagination by comparing it with other kinds of imagination.
This sort of comparison might seem alien to legal thinking. The
supposed incapacity of the legal mind for such extra-legal compari-
son was fixed in a notorious dictum of Thomas Reed Powell, who
alleged that when "you can think about something which is at-
tached to something else without thinking about what it is attached
to, then you have what is called a legal mind."9 It is not that lawyers
have been thought incapable of making any connections at all:
connections, even creative ones, are of course the coinage of the
common law. It is rather that the range of connections has appeared
circumscribed within a discrete, closed universe of discourse, the
world of stare decisis. Other worlds intrude only to be transmuted
into the terms of the legal one; outside connections are processed
into a cash-and-case nexus.
One example of this reductionist conversion is an advertise-
ment for the Medical Atlas for Attorneys which appeared in the
Journal of the American Bar Association and which read in part:
More than 2000 drawings expose the entire anat-
omy-structure by structure from skin surface to skeleton.
Brief marginal text notes alert you to the possibilities of your
client's case; you see at a glahce the potential implications.
Every part of the body is keyed with citations to cases,
awards, ALR annotations, and other references which take you
directly to the relevant law.1"
7 Id. at 288 (quoting The Form of Solemnization of Matrimony).
Another unusual book with wide-reaching selections is W. BISHIN & C. STONE, LAW,
LANGUAGE, AND ETHICS (1972). I hold that it is not as radically innovative as White's on the
ground, among others, that it is a collection of readings in jurisprudence and not a casebook.
The Legal Imagination, I will argue, is a casebook.
I Quoted in Arnold, Criminal Attempts-The Rise and Fall of an Abstraction, 40 YALE
L.J. 53, 58 (1930).
10 52 A.B.A.J. (1966) (ad follows p. 788) (emphasis added).
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The lawyer translates the human body from the world of nature into
the world of courts just as Linda Lovelace translates it into the
world of pornography: the body is made to seem incredible but is
actually divested of mystery; it is seemingly opened to illimitable
possibilities but is in fact reduced to an object denuded of wonder.
The body loses the referents of a human world, to be analyzed into
cases. Such is the paradigmatic fate of things and acts brought
within the processes of law.
It is therefore singular that Professor White stimulates the
reader to discover comparisons to worlds outside of law. His purpose
is not to grind those other worlds through the wheels of law but to
define the law by looking at it from the outside. The law thus de-
fined can be controlled; one can invest the law, and one's life within
it, with more deliberate, more creative responsibility. As he ob-
serves: "For some people, law leads to an ever duller and more
restricting life, to drudgery and routine; for others, to a life by
comparison free and self-expressive, which seems to yield and form
itself to the controlling intelligence or imagination."" Professor
White would have law render us a life of choice.
We have been reaching for a book like this, moving toward it
by degrees for as long as we have reckoned with the truth that law
is neither self-enclosed nor self-sufficient. Thus casebooks have
dressed their cases with ever more generous dollops of economic
theory and even theology.'2 Law schools have been developing
courses like "Law and Literature" and "Law and Psychiatry"; the
Harvard Law School together with the National Endowment for the
Humanities has experimented with a program in law and the hu-
manities. But The Legal Imagination is qualitatively different from
such uncertain alliances. There is a lot of literature in this book, but
it is not simply a law-and-literature book; it is rather a book about
law as literature. There is a lot of imagination in this book, but it
is not simply a book about law and the imagination; it is rather a
book of the legal imagination.
II. TEACHING LAW AND TEACHING ITS MEANING
I have found myself treating this book like the manuscript for
a play: imagining performances as I read. The performances are of
pedagogical utopias. And, like any utopias, to borrow Mannheim's
" WHITE 49.
2 See, e.g., E. HANKS, A. TARLOCK & J. HANKS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY (1974)
(economics is to be found throughout the book; theology at 82-88).
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definition, they burst "asunder the bonds of the existing order."'' 3
The book is not only the blueprint for an uncommon law school
course but also a creative challenge to the existing legal curriculum.
My own present students come to law school willing to work.
They do not always appreciate in advance how much work of what
kind is involved, and they have not always been prepared for it, but
they want to succeed. Good teaching nourishes this desire and helps
it develop into a technical command and a respect for craftsman-
ship. Although this is a great, difficult, and rewarding job in and of
itself, Professor White's book reminds me that there is a more com-
plex and demanding responsibility: to seek the meaning of the rules,
of law, of success in law.
A. A Joint Venture
The meaning of law is a subject not often raised in law school
classrooms by either teachers or students, except perhaps sardoni-
cally. One of the more intriguing reasons advanced for this omission
is that teachers themselves are uncertain about the meaning of law,
its significance sub specie aeternitatis. This uncertainty is in turn
perceived as symptomatic of a more general loss of direction, a
pervasive loss of a sense of transcendence.
Professor White emboldens me to believe that the uncertainty
may actually be turned to advantage and serve as a clue to the form
and content of a renewed search for meaning. If one does not know
the answers, he cannot teach them to students. But he is then free
to seek answers with students. Uncertainty becomes an occasion not
for abandonment of the study of the meaning of law but for a fresh
approach to it. It becomes an occasion for a joint enterprise.
The collegial, relational form of such an undertaking itself has
substantive importance and may be described as "educative friend-
ship," a notion Professor White derives from Clarendon's A True
Historical Narration of the Rebellion and Civil Wars in England.4
As White reads him approvingly, Clarendon expresses the art of life
as an art of education for which there is no outline and which does
not lie in the content of instruction because it is to be located in the
relationship in which the process occurs: "education between
friends."' 5 Accordingly, in the face of uncertainty "where the goal
of life is inexpressible," one "can still point to the relationship from
K. MANNHEIM, IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA 204 (L. Wirth & E. Shils trans. 1936).
' WHITE 903-25.
' Id. at 922.
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which [life] derives its virtue, its power, and its meaning."' "
This "educative friendship" has both pedagogical and jurispru-
dential implications. Pedagogically, it suggests law classes which
are truly Socratic and in which students may be asked, in Professor
White's words, "to speak not as. . .student(s) but as. . .indepen-
dent mind(s)."'I Jurisprudentially, it indicates that law, like law
teaching, is essentially relational, so that collegiality in the class-
room is the form best suited to the content of law. 8
While I may not finally be satisfied with the notion of
"educative friendship," it is not preposterous and not a little in-
triguing, and it warrants further comment. First, the "friendship"
involved here is not soft-headed or lax. Nietzsche claimed that in
"a friend one should have one's best enemy."' 9 Professor White's
students may, not altogether joyously, believe themselves possessed
of such a friend. His requirements are searching, his expectations
great. Second, by way of promoting collegiality, he adopts as an
author a personal form of address ("I" and "you"); and as a teacher,
he suggests that students exchange and criticize one another's writ-
ten work before handing it in.2" Competitive methods of teaching are
disavowed. 2'
It bears noting that these are formal devices. Personal, collegial
teaching does not just happen-it requires artifice and structure.
What is true of the imaginative practice of law is true of the imagi-
native law class: while intuition plays a role, it must be accompa-
nied by rigorous and sometimes painful discipline. Thus, while Pro-
fessor White's book is personal and self-expressive and requires a
personal and self-expressive response from the student, it exhibits
and evokes artfulness.22 A collegial class is an artistic achievement
" Id. at 922-23.
WHITE XXi.
I am certainly willing to entertain the possibility that the meaning of law can be
expressed in terms of human relationships. The idea, of course, is not a new one. Montes-
quieu, for example, was persuaded that "[1]aws, in their most general signification, are the
necessary relations arising from the nature of things." C. MoNrESQUIEU, THE SPmRIT OF THE
LAWs, in GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD, No. 38, Bk. 1, 1, at 1 (T. Nugent trans.
1952). The Roman word lex originally meant intimate connection, "namely, something which
connects two things or two partners whom external circumstances have brought together."
H. ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 188 (1965). Lex allowed former enemies to become friends or
allies. Going back still further, the Hebraic Decalogue defines the mode for right relationships
between a people and their God and, in consequence, among the people themselves.
" F. NIETZSCHE, THUS SPOKE ZARATHUSTRA, in THE PORTABLE NIETzSCHE 103, 168 (W.
Kaufmann trans. & ed. 1954).
2 WHITE XXii.
21 Id.
21 "Shown to the public," Nicola Chiaromonte once remarked, "one's inner life always
1977]
The University of Chicago Law Review
impossible without technique. To speak of legal education as a joint
endeavor, therefore, is to speak of it not as abandoning structure but
as adopting a common, thoughtful discipline.
B. The Process
Legal education as traditionally conceived is largely static.
Even the non-traditional mind thinks of Contracts and Torts as
"blocks. 2 3 The casebooks, too, are blocks, tablets of stone that pile
up until the student has constructed a base on which to erect a
career. Professor White notes about legal education so conceived
that the "implication is that there is in the world an identifiable
thing or body of knowledge called 'law' which is transferred from
teacher to student. The process of the classroom can be expressed
in a transitive verb with a double accusative: 'I teach them law' is
parallel to 'I give them soup.' "24
There is another order of legal education, however-the kind
that allowed Archibald MacLeish to discover that by no study bet-
ter than that of law could one envision "the interminable journey
of the human mind, the great tradition of the intellectual past which
knows the bearings of the future."' Professor White's book is predi-
cated on such a vision. Law and legal education are, for him, in
movement: if they may be expressed in terms of relations, the rela-
tionships are dynamic.
Professor White creates a sense of sheer movement from the
start. The first reading in the book is taken from Mark Twain's Life
on the Mississippi,28 and it is immediately followed by other selec-
tions on the Mississippi and adventure. Throughout the book this
suggestion of flow and exploration is never far below the textual
surface. The book is summarized at one point as an attempt to
enable the reader to look back at his life, to take a position from
which to survey his education and to address the question: "Where
do I go now?" '27 The final chapter then begins by advising: "You
seems simulated-or rather, only to the degree that it is well-feigned does it not seem so."
N. CHIAROMONTE, Antonin Artaud and His Theater, in THE WORM OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND
OTHER ESSAYS 112 (1976).
21 One of the last selections in The Legal Imagination is an interview with Morris Abram,
then President of Brandeis University, who is questioned about a proposal for a new law
school. Experimental though his ideas are, Abram nevertheless speaks of the curriculum as
including "the basic 'building block' courses .... " WHITE 938, 940.
21 Id. at 927. "Soup" is a polite substitute for what some of my students think I give
them.
MacLeish, Apologia, 85 HAiv. L. REV. 1505, 1510 (1972).
21 WHITE 10.
21 Id. at xxi.
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have been pushed off, as it were, to make your own way . ... "8
The reader is encouraged to make a new beginning, "to pull together
what you have done in this course, and in law school, to put it into
some sort of order, and move on." 9 Thus the author engages the
reader in a journey; the book is a passage.
As a teacher, Professor White achieves a sense of movement
through the surprisingly simple device of the weekly writing assign-
ments. These assignments serve several vital functions. For one,
they draw the readings together and focus them. Typically, refer-
ence to the coming assignment is made in the introduction to each
section and at scattered points later in the section. Consequently,
the student reads to the particular end of producing a writing; he is
encouraged to recognize in the selections a common, specifically
useful resource, with the consequence that the selections appear
neither so strange nor so disparate. A second function of the assign-
ments is of course to make the students better writers, in command
of the English language from having worked closely with it week in
and week out.
A third function of the writing assignments-and the most
noteworthy function-is to involve the student in the process of law.
A basic premise of the course is that law is literature. The student,
in the process of writing, becomes what Professor White says the
lawyer is: a creator of literature, a translator of human activity
and experience. The student creates the real subject matter of
the course. His writings are subjected to case analysis: cross-
examination and the drawing out of nuances, contradictions, and
limitations. In this sense The Legal Imagination is a casebook
which enables the reader, not to "parrot" back parts of a system,
but to do for himself what he has seen being done by others.
This is clinical education in the best sense and should not be
overlooked as such. My own students are anxious to plunge into the
real world, and although I am not altogether willing to concede
reality to the world they have in mind, I agree that law school is not
the real world. Indeed, law schools are never so unsuccessful, it
seems, as when they pretend that they are. Law school is really more
like play, an analogy that does not at all assail its seriousness or
importance. Like play, law school "is not life and affords. . . more
of a chance for experimentation, a wider scope for the realization of
. . . imagination than life itself. '3 My point is not to denigrate
11 Id. at 757.
2, Id.
11 K. EBLE, A PERFECT EDUCATION 10-11 (1966). The statement is made in the context of
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traditional clinic-in-law programs, but only to call attention to the
value of those academic clinics like Professor White's, which honor
the spirit of play by inviting students to experiment in the creation
of utopias. A student in White's course is asked, for example, to
create an insanity defense.31 That is a utopian exercise.
The ultimate goal of encouraging such play is perhaps so grand
as to attract ridicule: it has been said that whenever "the utopia
disappears, history ceases to be a process leading to an ultimate
end. The frame of reference according to which we evaluate facts
vanishes, ' 32 and we are at last brought "to a 'matter-of-factness'
which ultimately would mean the decay of the human will. ' 33 In
short, without utopias and some opportunity to engage in creating
them, a law student will simply not be as adequately equipped for
either judgment or improvement of the world.34
C. The Method: Cases, Policies, and Fundamental Questions
"How odd it may seem," Professor White remarks almost cas-
ually at one point, "that law school does not begin with, or perhaps
consist of, a course on the subject of justice: what it is and how it
can be achieved. 3 However, as he knows 36 and as another has ob-
served, the "beginning is not what one finds first: the point of depar-
ture must be reached, it must be won."37 In law school the beginning
of justice and meaning is won by wrestling with the cases and rules.
These make for a good start. There are ancient appeal, fascina-
tion, and fun in them; they are rich in tragedy, antagonism, and
high as well as low comedy. No student would want to miss the
fertile octogenarian 8 and the unborn widow 39 of the Rule Against
Perpetuities. Nor, in studying rescission, the mistake about the in-
fertility of the cow Rose 2d of Aberlone."° Nor the pleasurable words
a discussion about public schools.
3, WHITE 360.
32 K. MANNHEIM, supra note 13, at 253.
3 Id. at 262.
11 "The essential conclusion is that the proponent of a Utopia, be he philosopher, intel-
lectual, or mere conscious protester, does not want to rule or to be a councilor of the prince,
but simply to convince those who share his condition and his dissatisfaction with the present
state of affairs." N. CHIAROMONTE, Modern Tyranny, in THE WORM OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND
OTHER ESSAYS 231 (1976).
3 WHITE 631.
I infer his knowledge from the context of the question about a course on justice. It is
asked in conjunction with discussion of excerpts from Plato.
11 P. RICOEUR, THE SYMBOLISM OF EVIL 348 (1967).
See Jee v. Audley, 29 Eng. Rep. 1186 (Ch. 1787).
See Loring v. Blake, 98 Mass. 253, 259 (1867).
4o See Sherwood v. Walker, 66 Mich. 568, 33 N.W. 919 (1887).
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themselves: feoffors and feoffees, the assize of novel disseisin, and
fee tail female specials. Rules and cases prevent the aggressive error
of always pressing the fundamental questions and nothing but the
fundamental questions.
Soon after the cases come the policies and purposes that offer
provisional explanations for the way rule and precedent are de-
ployed in given settings. The Legal Imagination brings policy dis-
cussion to the fore. In doing so, it reflects an established trend, but
Professor White takes the trend a step further: policy is important,
but it is penultimate. The ultimate question is "how an intelligent
and educated person can possibly spend his life working with the
law, when life is short and there is so much else to do." 4' This is a
question about the meaning of law which becomes, in his hands,
personal and concrete. Yet the question is not for him a separate
inquiry. It is part and parcel of the law school curriculum.
The subchapter on the insanity defense illustrates his general
approach.42 After a brief introduction to the subject about to be
traversed, the subchapter opens carefully by setting out the Modern
Penal Code proposals for formulation of the insanity defense.43 It is
straightforward material, which is then drawn through a series of
cases and questions in the received case-method style. But while the
method itself is conventional, its application and results are not.
One innovation is White's treatment of the insanity defense as
a label or caricature to be analyzed, case-method style, as language:
Is the defense as generally articulated an adequate description of
the person or phenomenon sought to be described? What is its func-
tion in the institution which employs it, and what does it intimate
about that institution? What does it imply about the people on the
jury to whom it is addressed, and what does it tell us about those
(judges, psychiatrists, and lawyers) who invoke it? Because the
reader himself has spoken or may in the future speak in the tongue
of the insanity defense, the question finally becomes: What do you
mean when you talk that way, and what do you say about yourself?
Why? Professor White thus exposes rule, policy, and fundamental
meaning by subjecting the insanity defense-as a case of lan-
guage-to traditional case-method analysis. As a result he opens up
a new line of questions about the insanity defense, about the law,
and about us.
The other innovation is his selection of "cases" that draw out
I WHITE XXXii.
42 See id. at 317-63.
1, Id. at 319-24.
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the insanity defense or are played against it and that precipitate his
questions. Some are the standard fare of judicial opinions. Others
are not. The latter include Marais on the "well-known yellow South
African weaver bird," baboons, otters, Namaqua partridges, and
blindfolded men and boys;44 and Levi-Strauss as a "note case."" If
judicial opinions on the insanity defense can be characterized as
cases of language, then other cases of language, though non-legal,
may be set down helpfully alongside them.
For one example, Ferrin v. People" is followed by Emily Dickin-
son's "A Bird Came down the Walk."4 Ferrin concerned a child who
inexplicably shot his younger brother to death. The poem begins:
A Bird came down the Walk-
He did not know I saw-
He bit an Angleworm in halves
And ate the fellow, raw,
And then he drank a Dew
From a convenient Grass-
And then hopped sidewise to the Wall
To let a Beetle pass-"
The juxtaposition of the two selections suggests an answer to the
question that precedes them: "Is it perhaps only a failure of imagi-
nation that makes us believe that the man in the dock has a mind
that is directly comprehensible, that it has workings that can be
measured and tested?"49 The reader is made to realize how much
the label of insanity may conceal, not altogether unmercifully, and
he is ultimately better equipped to understand and use the insanity
defense.
A second example of this unconventional "case" method is
found in White's discussion of the M'Naghten rule.A0 There he intro-
duces, as though it were effortlessly natural to do so, a luminous
paragraph on Marlowe's Doctor Faustus. The M'Naghten rule
would prevent the punishment of a person who, through mental
illness, does not know that what he is doing is wrong; in Doctor
Faustus, the protagonist is condemned to eternal punishment:
" Id. at 329-33.
5 Id. at 334.




" Id. at 335.
" Id. at 325-27.
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[H]e blasphemes a God he knows to exist and to be omnipo-
tent. He is presented as knowing as fully as one could that what
he is doing is wrong; and at the last moment before death he
is offered a chance to repent, which he rejects. Is this the crimi-
nal or the insane mind? The theological answer is damnation.
The answer of the play seems to be that such a damnation is a
hideous wrong. This is not a play in which the author says he
disbelieves in God, but that he hates him."
This is not only a striking way to teach the M'Naghten rule but also
a fruitful, artful introduction to prior fundamental issues. The
M'Naghten rule cannot thereafter be viewed as simply a legal rule.
Professor White's book is comprised, then, of cases, albeit some
unorthodox ones. It is basically, I submit, a casebook. It does not
ask that students study anything but cases by any means other than
the case method. It teaches law, not some other subject, and it seeks
to educate lawyers and not some other professionals-literary crit-
ics, say, or philosophers. It makes its appeal to the possibil-
ity-important to my sucedss-oriented students-that it may assist
the student to become a more authentic lawyer, better at what he
or she chooses to do. It moves through rules and policies toward
fundamental questions and back again, not in order to discard the
rules and policies, but to illuminate them and enlighten those who
would use them.
The Legal Imagination leads one to consider-to engage in,
really-the interaction between, on the one hand, law and one's
practice of it, and on the other hand, the theory, as it were, of one's
life. To say the same thing in a different way, I find in this book
encouragement to study, to practice, and to teach in three dimen-
sions: that of rules and cases and their sometimes inherent fascina-
tion; that of rules and cases in relation to policies; and, most nota-
bly, that of rules, cases, and policies in relation to what one imag-
ines his life ultimately to be about.
III. LAW AS METAPHOR
Lawyers speak a reductive language. They do so necessarily, for
the disposition of cases requires it. Tort litigation, for example, is
possible only if the human body is analyzed into parts keyed to
cases. Paradoxically, this alchemy which reduces life to the immedi-
ate needs of courtroom judgment is meant ultimately to augment
51 Id. at 327.
1977]
The University of Chicago Law Review [44:681
and humanize life. As Archibald MacLeish has said, the "business
of the law is to make sense of the confusion of what we call human
life-to reduce it to order but at the same time to give it possibility,
scope, even dignity. 5 2 The law is marked by a pull in opposite
directions, a simultaneity of reduction and augmentation. The
themes and emphases of Professor White's book come together in
recognizing this tension in the law and recognizing it as the very
stuff of metaphor.53
Metaphor, Robert Frost submitted, is "saying one thing and
meaning another, saying one thing in terms of another." '54 If law is
a metaphor, what is it a metaphor of? What is the other thing meant
when we talk in terms of the law? Professor White notes how "one
has the feeling about a legal argument that it involves everything."55
When we speak the language of law, we may mean everything: law
may be a metaphor of life and death.
Law is a metaphor of death"6 when the practice of it is dull,
52 Macleish, supra note 25, at 1508 (emphasis added).
' See also WHITE 64, 761, 956.
White describes the judicial opinion as metaphor. The judge speaks of life in terms of
law in his opinions and expresses his own thoughts in traditional judicial language. Further-
more, the judicial ritual, he proposes, may be regarded as a kind of social metaphor. Id. at
773-74.
Lon Fuller addressed the subject of the use of metaphor in law. L. FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS
24-27 (1967). Professor White's central notion is that law not only employs metaphor but also
that it is itself a metaphor.
The University of Chicago Law School enjoys a certain claim to pre-eminence in the
exposition of the relations of law and trope. Fuller's book was first published as a series of
articles in the Illinois Law Review, which was then edited as a joint venture by students from
the University of Chicago, the University of Illinois, and Northwestern University. 25 U. ILL.
L. REV. 363, 513, 877 (1930-31). Then Edward Levi of the school drew attention to the manner
in which law proceeds by analogy (legal reasoning as reasoning by example). E. LEVI, AN
INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (1949) (first published at 15 U. CHI. L. REV. 501 (1948)).
It is parabolic that Professor White's advance from metaphor and analogy in law to law as
metaphor should continue at the same school.
5' Frost, The Constant Symbol, quoted in WHITE 766, 773, 956.
5 WHITE xxxiii. See also id. at 807.
White reserves to the reader the final, explicit realization that law can be a metaphor
of death but inches one toward the discovery by spending much of the first couple of hundred
pages on death: The first writing assignment, for example, is on death, WHITE 34; and an early
subchapter contrasts the legal language of death with other modes of talking about death.
Id. at 83-187. Later, he also notes how institutions, like individuals, are mortal. Id. at 303.
Consideration of the connection between law and death is neither easy nor popular.
William Stringfellow is one of the few to have addressed the issue directly. In the course of
an exposition of death as a pervasive moral category, Stringfellow writes:
Human beings do not readily recognize their victim status in relation to the principali-
ties. To illustrate concretely: the American legal system, a principality, has seemed to
me-a white, middle-class, Harvard-educated lawyer-to be civil and fair; to be viable,
both theoretically and, so far as I have been concerned, practically . ...
. . . How must this same American legal system have seemed to George Jackson,
Review
restrictive, a routine drudgery, despairing. 57 In this event, it is a
metaphor of the attorney's death. Law is a metaphor of death, too,
when it crushes the troubled and the troubling or oppresses the
powerless. In this circumstance it is a metaphor of the society's
death.
Law need not mean death; it can be made a metaphor of life.
It becomes a metaphor of life when it is, as White teaches, an enter-
prise of the imagination, a language which, controlled, is a vehicle
of self-expression. This is to claim that the lawyer, with law as the
given term of the metaphor, can define for himself the meaning of
the other term, without having to accept such meaning as may be
assigned by others, by the law itself, by any institution, or by de-
fault. In White's vision, the lawyer works out an identity for himself:
"You define a mind and character, very much as the historian or
poet or novelist might be said to do. At the end of thirty years you
will be able to look at shelves of briefs, think back on negotiations
and arguments. . . and say, 'Here is what I have found it possible
to say.' -s
In writing those briefs and conducting those negotiations and
arguments, one will experience, White notes, "the central frustra-
tion of writer and lawyer, the perpetual breaking down of language
in your hands as you try to use it."'" No language, he adds, "can
who died under such ambiguous circumstances in San Quentin after a dozen years
confinement issuing from conviction of a theft of $70. . .American blacks have consis-
tently, for all the generations in which there have been American blacks, been dealt with
by the legal system in the same way that this principality disposed of George Jack-
son. . . .There is no other honest way to describe the relation between the law in
America and American blacks . . . than in terms of the aggressions of the legal system
against human life ...
.. .If the American legal system seems viable for me and other white Americans
but is not so for citizens who are black, or for any others, then how, . . . in the name of
humanity, can it be affirmed as viable for me or for any human being?
W. STRINGFELLOW, AN ETHIC FOR CHRISTIANS AND OTHER ALIENS IN A STRANGE LAND 84-86
(1973). He adds: "Every sanction or weapon or policy or procedure-including law where law
survives distinct from authority-which the State commands against both human beings and
against the other principalities carries the connotation of death, implicitly threatens death,
derives from and symbolizes death." Id. at 110.
" The supposed lifelessness of legal education has a substantial history. The young
James Madison, for example, once wrote a letter of commiseration to a friend:
I was afraid you would not easily have loosened your Affections from the Belles Lettres.
A Delicate Taste and warm imagination like yours must find it hard to give up such
refined & exquisite enjoyments for the coarse and dry study of the Law: It is like leaving
a pleasant flourishing field for a barren desert. ...
J. Madison, Letter to William Bradford of January 24, 1774, in I THE PAPERS OF JAMES
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bear the stresses of our demands for truth and order and justice."'"0
To make law mean life will be, accordingly, a continual struggle
with words, an ongoing exploration of language.In the course of this exploration, the lawyer does work out an
identity for himself and so gives expression to his life. But his is not
the only self involved. What the lawyer says, he says on behalf of
clients. His struggle with words is an attempt to translate their
grievances into judicially cognizable terms. Finding, as a lawyer,
"what it is possible to say" is finding words that work for others.
The more such words the lawyer finds, the more he will have made
law mean life, his own life and that of others.
This translation which constitutes the most essential but hum-
ble task of the legal profession requires two faculties. The lawyer
must be able to use legal language, the medium of translation,
competently and creatively." But another capacity is of equal, even
more critical, importance. The lawyer must not only conjure legal
arguments; he must also be able to hear those, like the poor, whose
grievances cry out to be translated. These faculties, insofar as they
require more than imagination, may be said to depend upon con-
science, or heart. Professor White has taught us to animate the
imagination. How to inspirit the hear is another question, a question
antecedent to "educative friendship." An answer to it would burst
asunder the bonds of the existing legal curriculum.
POSTScRIPr
The beguiling yellow binding of The Legal Imagination refuses
to be left for long among the funereal browns and midnight blues of
my other casebooks. I cannot keep my hands off it. As I would affirm
in the heat of any seduction, even its imperfections-especially its
imperfections-hold attraction. Its contents are recurrent cause for
celebration, and its publication is ground for thanks to Little,
Brown.
Professor White says that the most remarkable expression of
Clarendon's ideal of educative friendship is the writing of the
History. The History is a book written "to us out of friendship. '62
So is The Legal Imagination. I have wanted to respond in kind. And
in tribute.
so Id.
" The original use of legal words and legal forms of thought is the function, in Professor
White's phrase, of a "controlling intelligence or imagination." See text at note 11 supra.
11 WHITE 925.
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